By Gregory Elich
(Note: This is an updated version of an article that originally ran on ZNet a couple of months ago.)
For all the ballyhoo surrounding the North Korean admission of a nuclear weapons program in meetings with U.S. officials, one salient fact has been overlooked. It never happened. Western news reports repeated endlessly the claims that North Korean officials admitted to a nuclear weapons program in an October 2002 meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and again during an April 2003 meeting, yet no evidence was presented other than Kelly’s assertions. On this matter, the word of the Bush Administration was accepted as sufficient evidence, the same Bush Administration that has consistently lied about every issue.
Citing the issue of a North Korea nuclear weapons program, the Bush Administration deliberately set about creating an international crisis on the Korean peninsula, eventually compelling North Korea to engage in a desperate bluff in hopes of ensuring its survival. To fully understand what took place during that those ill fated meetings and the mounting confrontation between the two nations it is necessary to view events in the broader historical context of U.S.-North Korean relations. This context is also important for explaining why the Bush Administration wanted a crisis, using the nuclear issue as a pretext for imposing punitive economic and political measures aimed at bringing about the collapse of North Korea.
Read the full story here, with numerous references.